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1. The historical perspective 
609 
Vertical restraints come in a glittering menu of exceptional vari-
ety, including resale price maintenance (RPM), tying, exclusive 
dealing, requirements contracts, "best efforts" clauses, full-line 
forcing, airtight and nonairtight exclusive territories, customer 
restrictions, areas of primary responsibility, profit-passover pro-
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VISIOns, restrictions on locations of outlets, and dual distribu-
tion. 1 Firms sometimes combine vertical restraints into packages. 
The great variety of individual and combined vertical restraints 
complicates the discovery of market effects. Indeed, identifying 
what restraint(s) a given firm is using at any particular time can 
be difficult. 2 
Despite the multiplicity of vertical restraints, both economics 
and the law have focused on them singly rather than in combina-
tions. Most cases and theoretical and policy discussions have 
examined RPM separately from "airtight" non-price vertical 
restraints (exclusive dealing, exclusive territories, and tying), the 
vertical restraints typically considered most likely to affect re-
source allocation and consumers, rather than analyzing combina-
tions of restraints. 3 
I Vertical integration and acquisition of a (or several) vertically re-
lated firm(s) are alternative forms of vertical control and can often 
achieve the same results, except for any differences in transaction costs. 
For a thorough analysis, including definitions, see P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES " 500-74 (3d ed. 1981). 
2 For example, it is often difficult to distinguish exclusive dealing, 
full-line forcing, and tying (id. " 558-63; Pittman, Tying Without Ex-
clusive Dealing, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 279 (1985); Jefferson Parish Hospi-
tal District No.2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984); Federal Trade 
Commission v. Sinclair Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923», or to differentiate 
RPM from non-price vertical restraints (World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-
Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1985); Lewis Service Center, 
Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 714 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 
U.S. 2678 (1984); AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 705 
F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1903 (1983); Eastern 
Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); In re Nissan Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 577 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978», or unilateral manufacturer behavior 
(Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984); 
Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 718 F.2d 256 
(1983); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980); Arnott v. 
American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
918 (1980». 
3 In effect, analysts have been studying checkers because chess is 
too difficult. However, business necessity forces the private bar to puz-
zle over the more complex questions. See, e.g., M. Denger & w. Tom, 
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RPM has generally been per se illegal, except per se legal until 
1975 in fair-trade states;4 tying was per se illegal under certain 
circumstances;s exclusive dealing was subject to a rule of reason 
analysis;6 and territorial and customer restrictions were generally 
Relationships With Suppliers, Customers and Franchisees (May 29-30, 
1986) (unpublished notes for Practising Law Institute, 27th Annual An-
titrust Law Institute); M. Denger & R. Joseph, Hypothetical Problems 
(May 7, 1985) (unpublished material for International Franchising Asso-
ciation, 18th Annual Legal Symposium, Workshop on Vertical Price and 
Nonprice Restrictions). We thank Michael Denger for making these in-
sightful materials available to us. 
4 For details, see Overstreet & Fisher, Resale Price Maintenance 
and Distributional Efficiency: Some Lessons From the Past, 3 CONTEMP. 
POI.'V ISSUES 43, 44-45 (1985). The courts have determined some prac-
tices to be essentially devoid of any redeeming value and thus "per se" 
or automatically illegal. For such practices, courts will condemn a prac-
tice without requiring an examination of the user's market power or of 
the actual effects of the practice. For practices where significant socially 
desirable effects are plausible enough, courts require a detailed exami-
nation of actual effects-i.e., rule of reason. In practice, however, this 
distinction is often unclear. See, e.g., Areeda, The Changing Contours 
of the Per Se Rule, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 27 (1985). Further, the Court may 
be moving away from using a per se standard in many situations where 
it has done so in the past. See, e.g., Gellhorn & Tatham, Making Sense 
Out of the Rule of Reason, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155 (1984-85); 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing 
Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board 
of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984); Broad-
cast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
5 Illegal tying generally requires a demonstration that there are two 
distinct products and that a firm with monopoly power in the tying 
product affects a "quantitatively substantial" amount of the tied prod-
uct's market. In essence, then, one must perform a rule of reason analy-
sis to apply the so-called per se test. For a recent discussion, see Sims & 
Lande, Vertical Restraints Guidelines: A Step Forward, Legal Times, 
Mar. 4, 1985, at 16. 
6 Although the Court did not understand how RPM or tying could 
yield any efficiencies, since Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard 
Stations), 337 U.S. 293 (1949), it has recognized the possibility of effi-
ciencies from exclusive dealing. See D. PEGRUM, PUBLIC REGULATION OF 
BUSINESS 403-08 (1965), for the early development of the legal status of 
exclusive dealing. The concurring opinions in Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
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legal.7 In 1948, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced its 
policy of treating virtually all intrabrand non-price vertical re-
straints as per se illegal. 8 In 1967, the Supreme Court adopted the 
Department's view, at least for restrictions on customers or 
locations.9 In 1975, Congress repealed the fair-trade legislation 
and returned RPM to its status of per se illegal. JO 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and Jefferson Parish Hospital 
District No.2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984), did recognize efficiencies 
from RPM and from tying. J. Fortenberry, A History of the Antitrust 
Law of Vertical Practices 96, n.264 (1985) (unpublished manuscript 
forthcoming in 11 RESEARCH IN LAW & ECONOMICS), considers the Stan-
dard Stations rule a modified per se standard. 
7 The government did not challenge territorial and other similar re-
strictions, and the courts typically found such restraints legal under a 
rule of reason analysis in private cases. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 6-7 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as A.B.A.]. 
8 Id. 
9 These restrictions include exclusive territories, locational restric-
tions (specifying where a distributor may and where it may not sell the 
product in question), areas of primary responsibility, and profit-
passover arrangements (where a distributor must compensate a dealer if 
it sells to customers located in other dealers' areas of primary responsi-
bility). Id. at 3-4. 
In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 
(1944), the Court found non-price vertical territorial restrictions per se 
illegal if they were an integral part of an RPM agreement. Based on this 
ruling, the Justice Department argued that "airtight" territorial and cus-
tomer restrictions were per se illegal. The first litigated case to challenge 
this view was White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), 
where the Court ordered an examination of actual effects (essentially a 
rule of reason analysis). The Court finally accepted the arguments for 
per se illegality for at least some non-price vertical restraints in United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
By the late 1960s, one might have feared for the legality of all non-
price vertical restraints. Lower courts, however, frequently ignored 
Schwinn and invented numerous evasions to uphold non-price vertical 
restrictions. However, the courts continued to uphold most instances of 
exclusive dealing. For a thorough discussion, see A.B.A., supra note 7, 
at 6-25. 
10 • Overstreet & Fisher, supra note 4, at 44-45. 
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Since 1975, the legal status of vertical restraints has changed. 
For restrictions on customers and locations, the uproar of criti-
cism over Schwinn induced the Court to reverse itself less than a 
decade later and make all non-price vertical restraints except 
tying subject to a rule of reason analysis. II In recent years, courts 
have upheld virtually all uses of non-price vertical restraints, 
including tying, except for manufacturers with large market 
shares. 12 Indeed, the Supreme Court has not found any non-price 
vertical restraints illegal (on vertical grounds) for more than 20 
years, except in cases that it later overruled. It has also denied 
certiorari in many cases that would have offered an opportunity 
to reaffirm the illegality of non-price vertical restraints under 
earlier case law. In contrast, the Court has reaffirmed its per se 
standard for RPM on many occasions. However, it has increased 
the legal burden for finding RPM and tying illegal under the per 
se standard. 13 
The changing legal status of vertical restraints largely fol-
lowed reinterpretations among economists and legal commenta-
tors. During the 1960s, industrial organization texts generally 
summarized the arguments against vertical restraints and rele-
11 Continental T.Y., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
12 J. Rill, Territorial and Customer Restraints (1985) (unpublished 
paper). 
13 The Court increased the evidentiary burden for finding illegal 
RPM in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 
(1984), and tying in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde, 
104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984). The Supreme Court has not found a non-price 
vertical restraints package illegal since United States v. Topco Assocs., 
405 U.S. 596 (1972). However, Topeo does not really count, because the 
Court considered it a horizontal cartel among dealers rather than a ver-
tical restraint between the manufacturer and dealers. See also infra note 
45. Prior to Topeo, the Court had found illegal tying in Fortner Enter-
prises v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner J), 394 U.S. 495 (1969), 
which it reversed in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises 
(Fortner IJ), 429 U.S. 610 (1977), after a new trial. Prior to Fortner I, 
the most recent Supreme Court case to find non-price vertical restraints 
illegal was United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967), which the Court explicitly overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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gated counterarguments and skeptics to footnotes. 14 By the late 
1970s, however, most economists had accepted the theoretical 
proposition that vertical restraints often permit important effi-
ciencies and cannot increase overall market power or allow firms 
otherwise to extend their market power, except under specialized 
conditions. 15 
The 1985 Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guide-
lines l6 reflect the dominant current economic analysis and go 
beyond current case law in an attempt to induce courts to 
continue the trend toward a more permissive policy toward non-
price vertical restraints. 17 A combination of objective rules and 
14 See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 505-16 (1970); J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
357-64, 658-60 (1968); D. PEGRUM, supra note 6, at 391-409. 
15 Compare F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 582-94 (2d ed. 1980), with F. SCHERER, supra note 
14, at 505-16; see also R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX 280-301 (1978); F. WARREN-BoULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF 
MARKETS (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
171-84, 196-207 (1976). 
16 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vertical Distribution Restraints Guide-
lines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Vertical Guidelines]. 
Although the Federal Trade Commission did not sign the guidelines, the 
Commission seems likely to follow its reaction to the 1982 Merger 
Guidelines and give the Vertical Restraints Guidelines "substantial 
weight" in its analysis of vertical restraints cases. Indeed, then-Bureau 
of Competition Director Timothy J. Muris praised the analysis in the 
guidelines. See BNA, Vertical Restraints Guidelines Evoke Mixed Recep-
tion Within Antitrust Bar, 48 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RER 237 (Jan. 
31, 1985). 
17 Sims & Lande, supra note 5; A. Abbott, The Justice Depart-
ment's Vertical Restraints Guidelines (1985) (unpublished paper pre-
sented to the New York Law Journal's Sixth Annual Program on 
Distribution, New York, Apr. 19, 1985); Vertical Guidelines, supra note 
16, § 1. Indeed, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust 
Thomas E. Kauper described the guidelines as "more in the nature of an 
amicus brief, designed primarily to influence courts in private cases to 
which the Division is not a party. . . a revelation of what the Antitrust 
Division believes the law should be." See BNA, Monopolies Subcommit-
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wide-open discretion, the guidelines designate a large structural 
safe zone for non-price vertical restraints. However, for instances 
that exceed the structural thresholds, the guidelines provide only 
a general indication that challenges will be rare, without indicat-
ing the precise circumstances under which the government would 
actually intervene. 
II. The economics of vertical restraints 
A. Increasing appreciation of efficiency potential 
In reaction to the government's strict treatment of vertical 
restraints after World War II and the cursory treatment in eco-
nomic textbooks, a few skeptics, primarily associated physically 
or ideologically with the University of Chicago, started to ques-
tion their presumed anticompetitive potential during the 1950s 
and 1960s.18 Wouldn't manufacturers typically tend to have 
more market power than retailers or distributors, exploit this 
power by raising the wholesale price, and keep their distribu-
tors' and retailers' margins as low as possible? If so, why would 
manufacturers impose vertical restraints whose primary effect 
would seemingly be to shift some of their profits to their deal-
ers? This analysis suggested that manufacturers might volun-
tarily adopt vertical restraints to correct a market failure or 
tee Receives Views on Division's Enforcement Track Record, 48 ANTI· 
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 455, 456 (Mar. 14, 1985). For a similar evalua-
tion, see House Judiciary Committee, Resale Price Maintenance Portion 
of House Judiciary Committee's Report on H.R. 2348 to Authorize 
Appropriations for Justice Department for Fiscal 1986, reprinted in 48 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 1025 (June 13, 1985). 
18 See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: 
Price Fixing and Market Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373-475 (1966); Bork, 
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division I, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line 
Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 62 (1960); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers 
Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960); Bowman, The Prerequi-
sites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 
(1955); B. YAMEY, THE ECONOMICS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1954). 
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otherwise to enhance efficiency. The analysis led to explanations 
of how vertical control could reduce transaction costs, eliminate 
costly duplication and permit economies of scale in distribution, 
facilitate entry, eliminate all sorts of free-rider effects, and pro-
tect the quality and reputation of a manufacturer's brand. 19 Al-
though as yet there is only modest empirical evidence of the 
magnitude of these effects,zo the theoretical basis for their fre-
quent presence seems compelling. 
B. Can vertical restraints have anticompetitive effects? 
The anticompetitive analysis of vertical restraints is more 
complex and controversial and therefore requires a more de-
tailed discussion. 21 Vertical restraints might increase overall mar-
ket power in four ways: they might increase market power at a 
single stage, increase entry barriers, facilitate collusion, or raise 
rivals' costS.22 Vertical restraints might also enhance retailers' 
product differentiation activities and thereby have complex 
effects on competition and consumers' welfare. 
19 See, e.g., Marvel & McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and 
Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984); Klein, Crawford & 
Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); O. WILLIAMSON, MAR-
KETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); for 
a summary, see Fisher & Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical 
Merger Enforcement Policy, in 6 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 12-16 (R. Zerbe ed. 
1984). 
20 For discussions of these studies, see R. LAFFERTY, R. LANDE & J. 
KIRKWOOD, IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL 
RESTRAINTS CASES (1984); T. OvERSTREET, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: 
ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (Federal Trade Commis-
sion Staff Report 1983). 
21 The comparative length of this section carries no implication for 
the frequency of anticompetitive effects in comparison to efficiencies 
from vertical restraints. 
22 For a more thorough discussion in the often analogous context of 
vertical mergers, see Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 19, at 16-33. 
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1. INCREASING MARKET POWER AT A SINGLE STAGE Many econ-
omists argue on theoretical grounds that vertical restraints can-
not increase market power at a single stage. Consider the simple 
dichotomy of competition and monopoly. If both vertically re-
lated stages are initially competitive, their vertical combination 
cannot create market power anew. 23 If both stages are already 
monopolized, their vertical combination cannot increase overall 
monopoly power.24 If a firm already monopolizes a "down-
stream" market (the stage closer to ultimate users), market con-
trol at the earlier stage would add nothing to its ability to raise 
prices. Rather, the monopolist would want its suppliers to be as 
competitive as possible; market power "upstream" would there-
fore detract from the downstream monopolist's position. 
With the simple competition-monopoly dichotomy, then, the 
only interesting case is apparently when a monopolist uses 
vertical control to acquire market power downstream. An econ-
omist who views distribution or retailing as inherently competi-
tive naturally poses the question in these terms.2S 
This reasoning offers no potential for vertical restraints to 
harm competition. However, oligopoly complicates the analysis. 
23 See, e.g., F. WARREN-BoULTON, supra note 15. 
24 Indeed, such a c-ombination would eliminate the distortion of 
double monopoly and thereby be procompetitive. Machlup & Taber, 
Theories oj the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial, 57 AM. 
EeoN. REV. 1 (1967). 
25 As Bork characterized this literature, "There is a faint theoretical 
case, hardly worth mentioning [of an anticompetitive effect], ... but 
it is doubtful that narrow possibility has any application to reality." R. 
BORK, supra note 15, at 226. Bork was characterizing the theoretically 
equivalent situation of vertical merger. The "faint theoretical case" is 
where user firms can easily substitute other inputs for some of their re-
quirements of the monopolized product. For a summary and citations, 
see Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 19, at 18-21. Even in the "faint theoret-
ical case," efficiencies from vertical control could offset any anticom-
petitive effects. This line of analysis has brought the economics 
profession to a general agreement that vertical restraints should nor-
mally be legal. 
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Salinger26 and p erry27 have developed oligopoly models in which 
vertical control may lead to higher prices. Also, the analysis is 
fragmentary and offers no general conclusions about the effects 
of vertical control in oligopoly. These models analyze only the 
direct effects of vertical restraints. However, if vertical control 
leads firms to change their views of how they (and their com-
petitors) will react to changes in output (what economists call 
"conjectural variations"), then the range of anti competitive pos-
sibilities becomes far richer. 28 
2. RAISING ENTRY BARRIERS Many commentators have al-
leged that vertical restraints-especially restricted distribution-
can raise entry barriers. 29 Intuitively, existing firms tie up all 
existing distributors or retailers with exclusive dealing arrange-
ments so that entrants must find or create new distributors or 
retailers or induce existing ones to switch. Many economists 
have been skeptical of these allegations. 30 Suppose, for example, 
that existing manufacturers have exclusive contracts with the 
best (most efficient) retailers. The allegation that vertical re-
straints raise entry barriers is essentially that it is harder (i.e., 
requires greater retailer margins) for a new entrant to induce re-
tailers to switch suppliers than it was for the original entrants to 
26 M. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure With Dif-
ferentiated Products (1986) (unpublished paper, Columbia U.). 
27 M. Perry, The Theory of Vertical Integration by Imperfectly 
Competitive Firms (Ph.D. diss., Stanford U. 1976). 
28 See infra Section II.B.3. For a more detailed discussion, see A. 
FISHER, F. JOHNSON & R. LANDE, MERGERS, MARKET POWER, AND PROP· 
ERTY RIGHTS: WHEN WILL EFFICIENCIES PREVENT PRICE INCREASES? (Fed-
eral Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 130, 
1985). 
29 Indeed, the Vertical Guidelines, supra note 16, feature this possi-
bility prominently in § 3.22. See also Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticom-
petitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 
96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). 
30 For a thorough discussion, see Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 19, at 
22-27. 
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induce them to carry the product line. 31 Alternatively, new 
entrants might have to create their own distribution or sales 
organizations if existing channels were tied into existing manu-
facturers. This scenario essentially alleges capital market barri-
ers or management bottlenecks.32 A special problem might arise 
if an entrant's expected market share would be too small to 
support exclusive distributors or retailers and dual distributors 
or retailers were unavailable (because of exclusive contracts) or 
less efficient than exclusives.33 These allegations have been 
common in soft drinks and automobiles. 34 However, if ex-
31 This formulation of entry barriers follows Stigler'S definition. 
For a discussion of alternative definitions of entry barriers, see Dem-
setz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47 (1982). The U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,824 (1984) 
[hereinafter cited as Merger Guidelines], define entry barriers in terms 
of the amount of time that entry is delayed. Under this definition, verti-
cal restraints are more likely to raise entry barriers. 
First-entrant theories enjoyed some popularity a few years ago. See, 
e.g., I. WHllTEN, BRAND PERFORMANCE IN THE CIGARElTE INDUSTRY AND 
THE ADVANTAGE TO EARLY ENTRY, 1913-74 (FTC Economic Report 1979); 
R. BOND & D. LEAN, SALES, PROMOTION, AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
IN Two PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETS (FTC Staff Report 1977). However, 
there is minimal evidence that first entrants generally have lower costs 
than subsequent entrants of obtaining brand loyalties. 
32 On capital market barriers, see the discussion by Fisher & 
Sciacca, supra note 19, at 25-26. There is insufficient evidence to assess 
the empirical importance of vertical restraints in creating capital market 
entry barriers. The management bottleneck hypothesis is that managers 
of a manufacturing firm cannot manage distributing or retailing as well 
as they can coordinate activities with independent firms that provide 
these functions for them. We are unaware of empirical evidence to assess 
this hypothesis. 
33 For example, if existing aspirin manufacturers had exclusive 
dealing arrangements with all available drugstores, a new entrant could 
not set up a new drugstore chain. It could, however, attempt to convince 
some drugstores to defect and sell its brand instead of their previous 
brands. 
34 See, e.g., Joyce Beverages of New York, Inc. v. Royal Crown 
Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Sulmeyer v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975); L. WHITE, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
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elusive distribution creates both efficiencies and market power, 
one would not necessarily wish to prohibit the practice. 
Steiner has argued that restricted distribution (especially in 
combination with RPM or substantially equivalent non-price 
vertical restraints on leading brands) has also frequently delayed 
efficiency-enhancing reallocations of functions among vertical 
stages and hindered the diffusion of retailing efficiencies, at a 
great loss to consumers.35 For example, he argues that key man-
ufacturers have been reluctant to sell to innovative, lower-cost 
retailing institutions (such as department stores and general 
mail-order houses in the mid-nineteenth century and discount 
stores in more recent years), even when the new retailers were 
more efficient than existing retailers and offered comparable 
SINCE 1945, 147-52 (1971). In automobiles, some poor-selling U.S. and 
European models have had problems obtaining exclusive dealers. How-
ever, the Japanese manufacturers in general did not have that problem 
when they entered the U.S. market. This combination of experiences 
makes one wonder whether the problem is in obtaining distributors or 
retailers or in producing a high-quality product at a competitive price. 
Large economies of scale in bottling, selling, and distributing complicate 
the problem for soft drink manufacturers with small market shares. 
These allegations were important in the Commission's recent soft drink 
merger cases. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Sup-
port of Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Complaint for a Prelimi-
nary Injunction 22-24 (June 30, 1986), Federal Trade Commission v. 
Coca-Cola Co., Civ. 86-1764 (D.D.C. 1986). The court granted a pre-
liminary injunction, and the parties abandoned the attempted acquisi-
tion; 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986), vacated on grounds of mootness 
and remanded with instructions to dismiss, No. 86-5542 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 
21, 1987). See also Boston Consulting Group, The Future of the Soft 
Drink Industry 1985-1990 (undated; c. 1984) (unpublished manuscript). 
35 Steiner, Basic Relationships in Consumer Goods Industries, 7 
RESEARCH IN MARKETING 165 (J. Sheth ed. 1984); R. STEINER, VERTICAL 
RESTRAINTS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 13-24 (Federal Trade Commission, 
Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 66, 1982). Steiner argues that 
intrabrand competition for a "strong brand" reinforces interbrand com-
petition and that vertical restraints on a "strong brand" tend to reduce 
interbrand competition and thereby have anticompetitive effects. The 
more common analysis is that interbrand and intrabrand competition 
are substitutes-i.e., intrabrand competition is unnecessary when in-
terbrand competition is strong. He agrees with the consensus analysis 
that vertical restraints on "weak brands" tend to be procompetitive. 
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services. When the government has forced the manufacturer of a 
leading brand to broaden its distribution and stop maintaining 
retail prices, the resulting intrabrand competition has also forced 
competing manufacturers to lower their prices and retail margins. 
Steiner argues that these interventions have substantially in-
creased consumer welfare.36 
3. FACILITATING COLLUSION Vertical restraints, especially in 
combination, may facilitate collusion. Telser has argued that a 
combination of RPM, exclusive dealing, standardized markups, 
and agreements not to raid competitors' dealers may greatly 
facilitate a manufacturers' cartel. The absence of some of these 
"ancillary" restraints would make an anticompetitive effect far 
less likely.37 Similarly, Pittman argued that exclusive dealing and 
36 Steiner, The Nature oj Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 
143 (1985), mentions in particular FTC interventions against Corning 
Glass ovenware and Levi Strauss men's jeans as prime examples. Oster, 
The FTC v. Levi Strauss: An Analysis oj the Economic Issues, in R. 
LAFFERTY, R. LANDE & J. KIRKWOOD, supra note 20, at 47, concurs in this 
interpretation of the Levi Strauss case. 
A countervailing efficiency explanation for a reluctance to sell to dis-
counters is that retailers provide and pay for much of the promotion. 
Retailers can recover the promotional costs only if the manufacturer 
limits the number and type of retail outlets covering the product. See, 
e.g., Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 19. Opening the market to all re-
tailers may lower price, but at the expense of promotional services. Cus-
tomers do not necessarily prefer lower prices with fewer services. See, 
e.g., Hamilton, Why Rivals Are Quaking as Nordstrom Heads East, 
BUSINESS WEEK, June IS, 1987, at 99 (Nordstrom is enormously success-
ful in its department stores with a strategy of providing superior service 
at upscale prices). For another example, skeptics interpret the increase 
in short-run profitability of Corning and Levi after FTC complaints as 
these firms cashing in the quality reputations that they had earned from 
vertical restraints-at a cost of lower long-run profitability. 
Steiner answers that the sharp increase in the firms' stock prices 
after the FTC's legal victories is good evidence that ending restricted 
distribution and RPM raised the firms' long-run profitability. Moreover, 
he maintains that the proper measure is whether consumers, not Corn-
ing and Levi Strauss, gained. 
37 Telser, supra note 18, at 96-99. 
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tying reinforce each other and increase the probability of anti-
competitive effects.38 Steiner also argued that selective distribu-
tion combined with exclusive dealing might make interbrand 
comparisons more costly, especially for products purchased infre-
quently, by making side-by-side product quality and price com-
parisons difficult.39 Because each store would carry only one 
brand, exclusive dealing combined with restricted distribution 
would a:lso increase consumers' costs of making intrabrand price 
comparisons. Both effects would tend to raise retailers' margins 
or enable manufacturers to raise prices. 
These approaches, while intuitively plausible, have not been 
formalized into theoretical models. Most theoretical analysis 
focuses on individual restraints. The combination of two verti-
cally related markets complicates modeling substantially; each 
additional vertical restraint adds to the complexity.4O In short, 
substantial theoretical complexities inhibit analysis of the effects 
of packages of vertical restraints in oligopoly. 
4. RAISING RIVALS' COSTS An emerging literature argues that 
one or more firms can use vertical restraints (and other practices) 
to raise rivals' costs and thereby induce price increases that 
reduce consumer welfare.41 Under special conditions, vertical 
restraints may enable a firm or group of firms to raise their 
rivals' costs for important inputs or distributional services pro-
portionately more than they raise the costs of the initiating 
38 Pittman, supra note 2. 
39 Steiner, supra note 36, at 183-87. 
40 There is also neither a natural initial value for conjectural varia-
tions nor a natural way for vertical control to change the conjectures. 
Mathewson & Winter are pioneers in the complex analysis of packages 
of vertical restraints. See, e.g., Mathewson & Winter, An Economic 
Theory of Vertical Restraints, 15 RAND J. ECON. 27 (1984). 
41 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 29, and the sources they 
cite. 
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firm(s).42 Such strategic activity may inhibit the competitive 
viability of existing rivals and make new entry more difficult. 
5. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION EFFECTS What happens when 
several manufacturers simultaneously use vertical restraints to 
encourage their dealers to enhance product differentiation? Some 
of the promotion may be demand-diverting (switching customers 
among brands) rather than demand-creating (encouraging addi-
tional sales for the product category).43 Exclusive dealing to 
encourage product differentiation can also change retailers from 
valuable sources of fairly impartial information on the compara-
tive qualities of competing brands to biased advocates for a single 
brand. This effect can have adverse consumer protection ramifi-
cations. Aside from this effect, when vertical restraints encourage 
dealers to provide demand-enhancing services for a higher price, 
the welfare effects are ambiguous and depend on a comparison of 
the effects on marginal and inframarginal consumers.44 
42 Two of the necessary conditions are market power by the firm or 
group imposing the restraint and significant barriers to entry into the 
affected market. See Vertical Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.22; and 
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 29, passim, for discussions of some 
of the necessary conditions for some hypothesized instances of raising 
rivals' costs. Even when vertical restraints raise the costs of some firms, 
they may also generate efficiencies. The overall effect of vertical re-
straints that raise rivals' costs can therefore be procompetitive, anticom-
petitive, or innocuous, depending on the comparative magnitude of 
efficiency and anticompetitive effects. Vertical restraints that raise the 
costs of rival firms are therefore not necessarily bad. Since raising ri-
vals' costs cases often require a trade-off of efficiency and anticompeti-
tive effects, the task of establishing appropriate policy guidelines is 
complex. Economists have not yet worked out all the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for actions that raise rivals' costs to result in higher 
prices to consumers or decreased economic efficiency. 
43 For example, Steiner, supra note 35, at 174-77, who considers 
demand-diverting expenditures socially wasteful, analyzes this situation 
as a prisoners' dilemma. 
44 See, e.g., Comanor & Kirkwood, Resale Price Maintenance and 
Antitrust Policy, 3 CONTEMP. POl.'y ISSUES 9 (1985). 
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III. The Vertical Restraints Guidelines 
The DOJ Guidelines implement the dominant current eco-
nomic analysis of vertical restraints by quickly and clearly dis-
missing concern with non-price vertical restraints except in a few 
situations. However, they apparently treat "airtight" non-price 
vertical restraints as homogeneous, nonadditive factors and 
therefore do not address economic analysis that suggests complex 
effects from combinations of vertical restraints. 
The guidelines use a three-stage process to shorten review of 
vertical control. They explicitly discuss Step One (the structural 
analysis) and Step Two (the analysis of competitive effects). 
However, an initial definitional stage (which for symmetry we call 
"Step Zero") is equally important. The definitional and structural 
tests restrict analysis of difficult questions of actual competitive 
impact to situations where anticompetitive effects are signifi-
cantly plausible. This methodology eliminates expensive, lengthy 
rule of reason analysis in most investigations. 
Beginning with Step Zero, the guidelines separate vertical 
restraints into "pigeonholes" for easy analysis. The main pigeon-
holes are vertical or horizontal; non-price or price; unilateral or 
concerted; intrabrand or interbrand; and airtight or nonairtight. 
Although these distinctions are not always easy in practice, the 
guidelines simplify them by generally resolving all definitional 
doubts in favor of more lenient treatment. 
The first distinction-vertical or horizontal-is important, 
because the guidelines reflect the Administration's current prac-
tice of viewing horizontal restraints as highly suspect and vertical 
restraints as virtually always legal. Some situations, however, 
have both vertical and horizontal aspects. To suggest a few 
possibilities: a manufacturer may communicate with its dealers 
about vertical restraints; a manufacturer may sell both directly to 
final purchasers and through dealers ("dual distribution"); differ-
ent manufacturers may all use the same non-price vertical re-
straint (or combination of restraints); or all the dealers of a 
manufacturer's brand may jointly urge (compel) the manufac-
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turer to impose territorial restrictions on its dealers. In such 
cases, is there an agreement over the restrictions, and if so, is it 
vertical (manufacturer-dealer) or horizontal (a cartel of direct 
competitors, such as dealers or manufacturers)?4S The precise 
facts are critical, and small differences in the perception of these 
facts can often induce one to change his conclusion. The guide-
lines, however, consider these agreements vertical rather than 
horizontal in the absence of strong evidence of a horizontal, 
interbrand conspiracy. 
The distinction between RPM (per se illegal) and non-price 
vertical restraints (typically legal) can also be subtle. The guide-
lines caution: 
[B]efore characterizing a practice as a price restraint subject to per se 
treatment, there must be an agreement between a supplier and its 
distributors as to resale prices. . . . if a supplier adopts a bona fide 
distribution program embodying both nonprice and price restraints, 
the Department will analyze the entire program under the rule of 
reason if the nonprice restraints are plausibly designed to create 
efficiencies and if the price restraint is merely ancillary to the 
nonprice restraints.46 
The third distinction, unilateral versus concerted, follows a 
long legal tradition of permitting both RPM and non-price 
45 For some illustrations of the ambiguities of these distinctions, see 
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986); General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 
744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Car-
bonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Topco As-
socs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 
(1967); and United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). 
The guidelines do not always reflect case law here. See, e.g., Judge 
Posner's recent decision in General Leaseways that dealers' joint activi-
ties to urge (compel) a manufacturer to impose territorial restraints on 
them was per se illegal. His decision used both vertical and horizontal 
precedents. Compare these decisions to the Vertical Guidelines, supra 
note 16, § 2.1, quoted infra at note 49, and to A. Abbott, supra note 17, 
at 3, also quoted infra at note 49. 
46 Vertical Guidelines, supra note 16, § 2.3. 
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vertical restraints instituted unilaterally by a manufacturer.47 The 
Department follows precedents48 that require clear evidence of 
joint manufacturer-dealer activity to infer concerted (potentially 
illegal) rather than unilateral (legal) behavior. 
The distinction between intrabrand and interbrand competi-
tion reflects the view that purely intrabrand vertical restraints 
pose little threat to competition and should therefore usually be 
legal. The language comes very close to characterizing all non-
price vertical restraints as intrabrand and therefore legal, except 
in the presence of strong proof of a horizontal conspiracy.49 
47 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 
(1984); Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 718 
F.2d 256 (1983); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
48 E.g., Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980); Arnott 
v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
918 (1980); and other cases cited supra note 47. 
49 Sims & Lande, supra note 5, make the same point. In the words 
of the guidelines, "Even though, in some cases, intrabrand restraints 
can be characterized as horizontal agreements because competing deal-
ers act in concert, it is inappropriate to treat intrabrand agreements in 
the same manner that other horizontal agreements are treated. Such re-
straints can have no effect that could not also be obtained through the 
unilateral action of the manufacturer of the particular brands in ques-
tion. An intrabrand agreement should not create the inference that a re-
straint is being 'imposed' on a manufacturer." Vertical Guidelines, supra 
note 16, § 2.1. A. Abbott, supra note 17, at 3, is even more explicit: 
"the Justice Department will treat all nonprice intrabrand restraints-
that is, restraints involving dealers or manufacturers of the same 
brand-as vertical rather than horizontal." The guidelines have appar-
ently adopted Professor Liebeler's analysis. See Liebeler, Intrabrand 
"Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1982). The dis-
tinction between intrabrand and inter brand is thus virtually identical to 
that between horizontal (a dealers' cartel) and vertical (a manufacturer-
imposed intrabrand restraint). See supra note 45. Factually, it is not al-
ways clear which side has imposed the restraints on the other. See, e.g., 
Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United 
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). The authors of the guidelines 
believe that dealers can rarely force a manufacturer to impose vertical 
restraints, so they have a very high evidentiary requirement to consider 
intrabrand restraints as horizontal rather than vertical. 
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The fifth distinction separates "airtight" restraints (exclusive 
dealing, exclusive territories, and tying) from "nonairtight" verti-
cal restraints (such as selective distribution, locational clauses, 
and profit-passover arrangements) by arguing that the courts 
have typically found nonairtight restraints to be legal (sec. 2.5). 
The guidelines only apply, therefore, to airtight forms of vertical 
control "whose legal status remains somewhat uncertain" (sec. 
2.5). The Step One and Step Two analyses apply only for 
exclusive dealing and exclusive territories; because of legal con-
siderations, there is a separate methodology for tying (see below). 
The Department's definitional methodology, then, quickly 
disposes of most vertical restraints: all unilateral behavior and 
nonairtight vertical restraints are legal, and virtually all intra-
brand non-price vertical restraints are legal in the absence of 
strong evidence of a manufacturers' or possibly a dealers' cartel. 
The market structure tests (Step One) apply only for patterns of 
exclusive dealing or exclusive territories across manufacturers and 
their dealers that affect competition among different manufactur-
ers' brands. 
For these restraints, the guidelines use the most objective, 
easily determined structural factors that affect the likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects. The guidelines propose legality for non-
price vertical restraints for small firms (condition 1), unconcen-
trated markets (conditions 2 and 3), and markets where a large 
proportion of the sales are by firms not using "the same vertical 
restraint" (conditions 2 and 4). The Department therefore per-
mits vertical restraints where any of the following conditions hold 
(sec. 4.1): 
(1) the firm employing the restraint has a share of the relevant 
market of 10 percent or less; 
(2) the VRI [sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms 
using the restraint] is under 1200 and the coverage ratio [percentage 
of each market using the restraint] is below 60 percent in the same 
(e.g., supplier or dealer) relevant market; 
(3) the VRI is under 1200 in both relevant markets; or 
(4) the coverage ratio is below 60 percent in both relevant markets. 
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If none applies, the Department proceeds to Step Two, a more 
thorough examination of competitive effects. However, the De-
partment will not challenge exclusive dealing or exclusive territo-
ries agreements if entry is easy at both levels or if the firm using 
the vertical restraint has entered within the preceding two years.50 
For exclusive dealing or exclusive territories failing the struc-
tural analysis of Step One or the entry tests, a "structured rule of 
reason" test considers concentration, other firms' use of vertical 
restraints, the industry's tendency toward collusion, the extent of 
the vertical restraints' exclusionary effects, the "intent" of the 
firms, and any likely pro competitive effects.sl The guidelines are 
only minimally helpful for vertical restraints that reach this part 
of Step Two, because the Department does not explain how it 
proposes to weigh all these factors to determine overall legality. 
The accompanying figure summarizes the guidelines' method-
ology. The definitional stage (Step Zero) and Step One apply a 
series of six filters. The guidelines presume unilateral behavior, 
intrabrand restraints, and nonairtight restraints to be legal. They 
then dismiss concern if the market is unconcentrated, the cover-
age ratio is not overly high, or the firm's market share is low. 
Step Two continues with two more filters, to dismiss concern if 
the firm is a new entrant or if entry barriers are low. Only when 
vertical restraints pass through all eight filters and end up in the 
50 The Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, § 3.3, suggest that the De-
partment will generally use a two-year cutoff to determine when entry 
conditions are sufficiently difficult to cause concern. Unfortunately, the 
Vertical Restraints Guidelines are not as specific in defining entry condi-
tions. Moreover, the entry-condition standard goes one step further: if 
conditions of entry are "easy" at the stage where anticompetitive effects 
would have to occur, then the government will not challenge non-price 
vertical restraints, even if entry is difficult at the other level. 
51 For example, the guidelines explicitly recognize the possibility of 
firms using vertical restraints to raise rivals' costs. See supra Section 
II.BA. The Vertical Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.22 ("Excluding Ri-
vals"), discuss in detail two scenarios by which vertical restraints "may 
have the effect of excluding rivals by prohibitively raising either their 
cost of a vital input or their cost of distribution." Unfortunately, there is 
no discussion of how one is to determine whether vertical restraints have 
undesirable effects that the government might wish to challenge. 
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bottom, left channel does the analysis go further. With so many 
escape routes, one would expect the Department rarely to reach 
the rule of reason portion of Step Two. 
The guidelines treat tying separately (sec. 5), perhaps because 
the courts have always been more strict with tying than with other 
non-price vertical restraints. The guidelines' analysis of tying is 
less clearly articulated and therefore less useful than their treat-
ment of other restraints. The guidelines express no cOI?-cern with 
tying by a firm with a share of 30 percent or less of the tying 
product's market, unless "the tying arrangement unreasonably 
restrain[s] competition in the market for the tied product." If the 
firm's share exceeds 30 percent, the Department considers tying 
per se illegal if the firm has "dominant" market power and 
subject to a rule of reason analysis (of whether the "tie unreason-
ably restrain[s] competition in the tied product['s] market") 
otherwise. S2 
This prescription is not very helpful. For firms with market 
shares of 30 percent or less, the guidelines say that tying is usually 
but not completely safe; for firms with shares in excess of 30 
percent, there is little guidance. Although the guidelines do not 
legitimize tying by firms with small market shares, this Adminis-
tration is highly unlikely to challenge tying that involves only 
private, unregulated firms. The guidelines provide no analysis of 
why tying, even by a cartel or monopolist, could ever be anticom-
petitive. However, the majority opinion in Hyde, which may have 
condemned certain instances of tying because of wealth-transfer 
effects, probably constrained the authors of the guidelines from 
proposing per se legality for tying. s3 
For exclusive dealing and exclusive territories, the guidelines' 
almost exclusive concern is cartelization; for tying, the sole 
concern is monopolization. Since it is often difficult to distin-
52 This analysis comes from the Court's opinion in Jefferson Parish 
Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984). 
53 See Sims & Lande, supra note 5. 
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guish between exclusive dealing and tying,s4 this difference is odd. 
Analytically, there is no reason for different standards for tying 
than for other vertical restraints. 
IV. Policy considerations and the impact of the guidelines 
The complexity of the economic effects of vertical restraints is 
a challenge for antitrust policy. Economic theory supports both 
procompetitive and anticompetitive interpretations of vertical 
restraints, although the current prevalent opinion is that procom-
petitive scenarios are generally more credible. Ideally, empirical 
analysis would determine whether vertical restraints were usually 
procompetitive or anticompetitive in net effect. Unfortunately, 
the facts known about a practice are frequently consistent with 
both interpretations. 55 Indeed, the more compelling either the 
pro competitive or the anticompetitive scenario, the greater the 
likelihood that firms representing a large portion of the industry 
will find the same or similar combinations of vertical restraints in 
their best interests. Empirical analysis is thus difficult, and 
careful empirical evaluation of vertical restraints is rare. 56 Because 
of different perspectives and complexity of the analysis, scholars 
will differ in their interpretations.57 The guidelines' claim (sec. 
54 See, e.g., Pittman, supra note 2; P. AREEDA, supra note 1, at 809-
22. 
5S For example, when demand-enhancing services of retailers are 
important to a product's success, manufacturers may find vertical con-
trols such as restricted distribution and possibly exclusive territories im-
portant. The more important such retailer services, the more likely that 
virtually all manufacturers will use the same or similar packages of ver-
tical restraints. However, the more brands that rely heavily on retailer 
promotion, the greater the likelihood that some of the promotional ac-
tivities will be demand-diverting. This scenario can therefore have anti-
competitive effects only if several firms simultaneously attempt to use 
vertical restraints to generate efficiencies. 
56 For discussions of the few available examples, see R. LAFFERTY, 
R. LANDE & J. KIRKWOOD, supra note 20; T. OvERSTREET, supra note 20. 
57 For one example, see supra note 36. 
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3.2) that "vertical restraints generally have a pro competitive or 
competitively neutral effect" relies more on theory than on 
empirical evidence. We simply do not know the extent of anti-
competitive results.58 
An optimal antitrust policy would minimize the expected cost 
of the three types of policy errors. 59 With respect to vertical 
restraints, these errors are: 
Type 1 error: stopping desirable vertical restraints (errors of commis-
sion). 
Type 2 error: permitting undesirable vertical restraints (errors of 
omission). 
Type 3 error: incurring excessive costs of enforcement, litigation, 
and business uncertainty. 
In a world of expensive information, some policy errors are 
inherent; the design of the enforcement policy determines the 
actual mix. "Brightline" enforcement would minimize Type 3 
error at an inherent cost of Types 1 and 2 error, the choice of the 
S8 The Vertical Guidelines, supra note 16, § 4, continue: "even 
those vertical restraints not 'screened out' in Step One are unlikely to 
have anticompetitive effects. . . .tt However, the basis of this predic-
tion is entirely theoretical. Moreover, many price-fixing cases have 
arisen in markets (such as paper-box converting, road building, and 
trash hauling) where most economists would predict that price-fixing 
could not have any significant effect. E.g., compare Elzinga, New De-
velopments on the Cartel Front, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 3 (1984), and O. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLI-
CATIONS 234-47 (1975), with Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, Why Do Compa-
nies Succumb to Price Fixing?, 56 HARV. Bus. REV. 145, 146-47 (1978). 
Price-fixing conspiracies sometimes persist for many years and have sur-
prisingly large effects on prices. For example, a former high official in 
the Justice Department informally estimated that the bid-rigging con-
spiracies that the Department had detected had raised prices for road re-
pairs by an average of around 10 percent. 
59 For further discussion, see Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Consider-
ations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1670-77 (1983); 
for a formalization, see Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 19, at 72-75. For 
another, similar discussion, see Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and 
the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 157-59 (1984). 
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threshold level of legality determining the trade-off between 
Types 1 and 2 error. The opposite, unstructured rule of reason 
with no explicit standards, can lead to very substantial Type 3 
error in an attempt to reduce Types 1 and 2 error. "Bright lines" 
work well when legal and illegal behavior are clearly distinguish-
able or when the (direct and indirect) litigation costs are high. 
The strongest case for a rule of reason is where distinctions vary 
critically with the nuances of the restraint in question and 
litigation and uncertainty costs are low. With vertical restraints, 
however, competitive effects are complex, and expert witnesses 
often disagree over the probable magnitudes of efficiency, anti-
competitive, and thus net effects of combinations of vertical 
restraints. We therefore cannot be confident that judges will 
determine individual cases more accurately than a brightline 
approach would. There is no guarantee that a full rule of reason 
approach would decrease the sum of Types 1 and 2 error, 
although it would certainly raise Type 3 error in comparison to an 
approach containing presumptions and bright lines. The strongest 
argument in favor of per se legality for all vertical restraints is 
that any other legal standard would "lead to unacceptably large 
Type 3 error, that the inherent costs of business confusion and 
litigation are virtually certain to be greater than the maximum 
conceivable Type 2 error.6O 
60 Courts would have great difficulty in evaluating the desirability 
of permitting any given package of vertical restraints. Courts have var-
ied widely in how they have handled complex economic investigations. 
Some have refused to balance pro competitive and anticompetitive ef-
fects and resolved all doubt on the side of strict enforcement of antitrust 
laws; more recently, some courts have been more willing to attempt dif-
ficult rule of reason trade-offs of procompetitive and anticompetitive ef-
fects. For example, the Court has justified per se rules in large part to 
shield the courts from "ramb[ling] through the wilds of economic 
theory." United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). Per-
haps the classic statement of the inability of the courts to trade off effi-
ciency and anticompetitive effects of vertical restraints on a case-by-case 
basis is Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), discussed in depth in L. SULLIVAN, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 473-76 (1977). For a similar argu-
ment in the context of mergers, see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963). However, the courts have attempted 
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The guidelines offer a mixed strategy. The Step Zero defini-
tions and Step One structural analysis set out objective, clear 
zones of legality. For restraints that pass the guidelines' defini-
tional and structural standards for legality (and for new entrants 
and industries where entry conditions are easy), the guidelines 
minimize Types 1 and 3 error but may risk excessive Type 2 error. 
For restraints above the threshold standards, however, the guide-
lines string together a long list of sUbjective factors without 
providing clues to their weight, balance, or influence.61 For 
restraints in this zone, the guidelines promise substantial Type 3 
error. However, most antitrust practitioners predict that the 
current Administration will not challenge vertical restraints ex-
cept possibly in conjunction with strong evidence of actual 
horizontal collusion or involvement by some unit of govern-
ment.62 Indeed, this Administration has not supported any verti-
cal restraints cases. The Justice Department has filed no vertical 
cases since President Reagan's inauguration, and the Commission 
has issued only four complaints, all before Reagan appointees 
attained a majority.63 The overall effect of this enforcement 
difficult rule of reason trade-offs in other cases. See, e.g., Graphic 
Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 E2d 1560 (1Ith Cir. 
1983); Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 
(1979); In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 ET.C. 517 (1978), remanded for dis-
missal following passage of legislation that permitted the practices in 
question, sub nom. Coca-Cola Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 642 
E2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Moreover, the recent trend is toward rule of 
reason. See supra note 4. 
61 The treatment of tying has a similar deficiency; there is no defini-
tion of what constitutes "unreasonably" restraining competition in the 
market for the tied product or determines when a firm with a greater 
than 30 percent share of the tying product has "dominant" market 
power. 
62 For example, there is general "recognition that the Department 
has not really been in the vertical restraints enforcement business for a 
decade or so." See Sims & Lande, supra note 5, at 16. 
63 The Department of Justice's last three vertical cases involved 
RPM: United States v. Mack Trucks, Inc., Civ. 81-0102 (E.D. Pa. filed 
Jan. 12, 1981), dismissed without prejudice (July 8, 1981),4 TRADE REG. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 45,081, at 53,468-69; United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 
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strategy, then, is to minimize Type 1 error attributable to the 
federal government.64 Under a rule of reason analysis that empha-
sizes the legality of non-price vertical restraints in nearly all 
situations, Type 1 error could only arise as a result of incorrect 
judgment. 65 
The choice of threshold levels of legality (which determines 
the trade-off between Types 2 and 3 error) is guaranteed to 
provoke disagreement. Some economists and attorneys believe 
that vertical restraints have anticompetitive effects in the absence 
Crim. H-80-49 (D. Conn. 1980),4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) , 45,080, at 
53,436-37, and Civ. H-80-559 (D. Conn. 1981), 1981-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH), 63,979, at 76,067. Cuisinarts pleaded nolo contendere and paid 
a fine of $250,000 in the criminal case. The civil case ended in a consent. 
We thank Ralph Justus for providing information about Justice Depart-
ment cases. 
The Commission issued four complaints and accepted simultaneous 
consents in vertical restraints cases before Reagan appointees attained a 
majority on the Commission. The two most recent complaints arose 
from one matter involving an intrabrand cartel. In re Great Dane Trail-
ers, Inc., 102 ET.C. 1307 (1983); and In re Great Dane Distributor 
Council, 102 ET.e. 1315 (1983). Chairman Miller and Commissioner 
Douglas, the only Reagan appointees at that time, dissented in these 
matters. With respect to RPM, the Commission accepted consents in 
two cases when President Reagan had made only one appointment 
(Chairman Miller). See In re Onkyo, USA, Corp., 100 ET.e. 59 (1982); 
In re Germaine Monteil Cosmetiques Corp., 100 ET.C. 543 (1982). We 
thank Linda Knight-Stewart for providing information about Commis-
sion vertical restraints cases. 
64 Of course, the Department can only affect overall Type 1 error 
by convincing the courts to adopt its analysis. 
65 The Justice Department has offered to file amicus briefs for de-
fendants in private vertical restraints cases to help convince courts to 
adopt its analysis. See BNA, Distribution Seminar Speakers Differ on 
Current Vertical Law, Counseling, 48 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 716, 
719 (Apr. 25, 1985) (quoting Special Assistant to the Attorney General 
Alden E Abbott). The heavy evidentiary burden on the prosecution in 
Step Two further reduces Type 1 error. If the courts held the govern-
ment to the guidelines and gave it the burden of proof, it would be ex-
tremely difficult for the government to prosecute a vertical restraints 
case successfully. 
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of attempted collusion and monopolization frequently enough to 
justify enforcement concern.66 Because of the complexity of 
vertical restraints and the paucity of reliable empirical evidence, 
this disagreement with the guidelines rests largely on faith. One's 
preferred legal standard also depends on one's view of the proper 
goals of antitrust. The current Administration views efficiency 
considerations as the sole rationale for antitrust enforcement; an 
alternative interpretation is that Congress passed the antitrust 
laws to prevent wealth transfers from consumers to firms with 
market power.67 A standard based on wealth transfers implies 
more antitrust enforcement than does a standard based on eco-
nomic efficiency. Regardless, nearly all antitrust scholars should 
be comfortable with a presumption of legality for vertical re-
straints for firms with market shares of 10 percent or less, for 
new entrants, and for industries where firms using similar re-
straints account for no more than 60 percent of the sales and 
there is no evidence of horizontal collusion.68 
Implementing guidelines always causes confusion, and the 
Vertical Guidelines are no exception.69 For example, consider a 
66 See supra Section II. 
67 Compare, e.g., the efficiency view in Baxter, Responding to the 
Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 618, 619-21 (1983), 
, with the wealth-transfer view in Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original 
and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Chal-
lenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). The more heavily one weighs wealth 
transfers, the greater one's concern for the price-increasing potential of 
vertical restraints. For illustrations of this point, see A. FISHER, F. JOHN-
SON & R. LANDE, supra note 28. When vertical restraints permit price in-
creases to encourage dealer-provided services, there can be an 
evidentiary morass to separate procompetitive from anticompetitive 
portions of any price increase. See supra Section II. 
68 There will probably be less agreement on the policy of legality for 
vertical restraints in the absence of high concentration (where the VRI 
does not exceed 1200). For example, many price-fixing cases involve in-
dustries with low concentration (i.e., an HHI far below 1000). See supra 
note 58. 
69 Some members of the private bar have protested the unnecessary 
complexity of introducing the VRI. Sims & Lande, supra note 5, sug-
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moderately concentrated market with relatively difficult entry 
conditions. Suppose that 50 percent of the market had been using 
a vertical restraint and that another firm adopted a similar 
restraint, bringing the coverage ratio above 60 percent. Should 
the government (or the private bar) challenge the newest firm to 
use the restraint, the industry's largest firm, or all firms with 
more than 10 percent of the market? Indeed, given the variety of 
vertical restraints, when should one include different restraints 
with similar effects in calculating the coverage ratio?70 The guide-
lines talk in terms of "the" restraint, but economic analysis71 
suggests that restraint packages pose more anticompetitive risks 
than a single restraint. Should the standards tighten as firms 
mUltiply restraints? 
The roles of private and state enforcement further complicate 
evaluation. The guidelines are only a statement of enforcement 
policy; they are not the law.72 Because a substantial majority of 
vertical restraint cases have been private,73 the guidelines can only 
gested that the Department could have issued the same guideline thresh-
olds by using the Herfindahl index (HHI) and a coverage ratio to re-
place the VRI. 
70 For example, suppose that one firm uses tying, a second uses ex-
clusive dealing, and a third uses a combination of exclusive territories 
and a refusal to sell to discounters. The firms presumably use these ver-
tical restraints to accomplish very similar goals. Whose market shares 
should one include in calculating the VRI? 
71 See supra Section II. 
72 See, e.g., HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDE-
LINES RESOLUTION, H.R. REP. No. 399, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), re-
printed in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 733, pt. 2 (Dec. 9, 1985); House 
Judiciary Committee, supra note 17. At least one judge recently made 
precisely this point in response to a defendant's argument that its verti-
cal restraints were legal under the guidelines. See infra note 86. 
73 In every year between 1970 and 1984, private antitrust cases filed 
ranged between 90.1 and 95.6 percent of the sum of U.S. government 
and private cases. See Salop & White, Economic Analysis of Private An-
titrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1002 (1986). In their sample of all 
private antitrust cases filed in the five federal districts during 1973-83, 
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affect Types 1, 2, and 3 error by influencing the courts. Although 
"[t]here is a trend toward legality of all nonprice vertical re-
straints,"74 some courts apply more stringent standards. In coun-
seling clients, James F. Rill, current Chairman of the Antitrust 
Section of the American Bar Association, cautioned against 
"reliance on the Justice Department's vertical guidelines."7s An-
other practitioner added that 90 percent of private vertical re-
straint cases are settled, often on stricter terms than the virtually 
per se legal guideline standards.76 And as more plaintiffs lose 
RPM and dealer termination cases, they are turning to state 
antitrust and tort laws with increasing success.77 
A few years ago, economists and attorneys often criticized 
antitrust policy for a pathological concern over Type 2 error at an 
excessive cost in Type 1 error. In reaction to these excesses, the 
current Administration has raised the prosecutorial burdens that 
had led to excessive Type 2 error.78 The guidelines do reduce Type 
Salop and White found that the primary or secondary allegation con-
cerned vertical practices (vertical price-fixing, dealer termination, re-
fusal to deal, tying, or exclusive dealing) in a majority of instances: 
between 54 and 81 percent each year during 1973-79 and between 41 and 
58 percent each year during 1980-83. [d. at 1042. The average number 
of private cases per year that included vertical allegations dropped by 
approximately 40 percent from 1973-79 to 1980-83. [d. at 1002, 1042. 
For a discussion of another survey with similar results, see Fisher & 
Sciacca, supra note 19, at 104 n.2. 
74 See BNA, supra note 65, at 716 (quoting James F. Rill of Collier, 
Shannon, Rill & Scott, Washington, D.C.). 
75 [d. 
76 [d. at 717 (reporting comments by Harvey M. Applebaum of 
Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.). 
77 [d. at 718 (reporting a presentation by Jay Greenfield of Paul, 
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York). 
78 As an example in a related context, former Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust J. Paul McGrath implied that the Antitrust Divi-
sion was using the higher evidentiary requirement of the Sherman Act to 
evaluate merger cases. He stated that repealing section 7 of the Clayton 
Act (which covers mergers) "would not change our enforcement policy 
at all." See Henderson, Baldrige Merger Plan Criticized, Washington 
Post, Mar. 3, 1985, at F1, F8. 
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2 error by providing clear zones of proposed legality for vertical 
restraints. Many scholars, practitioners, and businessmen will be 
comfortable with this portion of the guidelines. 
From the perspective of two years of experience, the guide-
lines have probably not been as influential as the Department had 
hoped and have therefore had only a modest effect in reducing 
Types 2 and 3 error. They have, however, generated controversy 
and political reactions, including two days of hearings by the 
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House 
Judiciary Committee. The House issued the subcommittee's re-
port condemning the guidelines and attached to the Department's 
appropriations bill a resolution expressing "the sense of the 
House that the Vertical Restraints Guidelines . . . are not an 
accurate expression of federal antitrust law or congressional 
intent, shall not be considered by the courts as binding or 
persuasive and should be recalled by the Attorney General.",9 
The states' attorneys general agreed with the House that the 
federal government is no longer enforcing the law with respect to 
vertical restraints. This issue solidified the opposition of state 
attorneys general to the Administration's antitrust program; for 
the first time ever, they agreed unanimously on an antitrust policy 
issue. All 55 members of the National Association of Attorneys 
General (NAAG) endorsed a competing set of Vertical Restraints 
Guidelines and promised to increase their scrutiny of vertical 
restraints. 80 
The NAAG Guidelines differ significantly from those of the 
Justice Department, both in object and in specifics.S\ The NAAG 
79 131 CONGo REC. Hll,391 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1985). See also BNA, 
Congress Takes Affirmative Steps to Attack Vertical Restraints Guide-
lines, 49 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 1019 (Dec. 12, 1985). 
80 There are 55 members, including attorneys general representing 
the District of Columbia and various territories. National Association of 
Attorneys General, Vertical Restraints Guidelines (Dec. 4, 1985), re-
printed in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) , 50,478 [hereinafter cited as 
NAAG Guidelines]. 
81 For a discussion of the NAAG Guidelines, see Baldwin, NAAG 
Issues Counter-Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 7 ANTITRUST 22 (1986). 
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Guidelines characterize existing case law from the point of view 
of prosecutors. Because the Supreme Court has issued only two 
substantive opinions on non-price vertical restraints in the past 15 
years,82 and academic opinion has changed significantly, the case 
law has some inconsistencies and offers room for differences in 
interpretation. 83 The NAAG Guidelines emphasize decisions 
favorable to prosecutors and warn the business community that 
state attorneys general will sometimes challenge restraints that do 
not violate the DOl Guidelines. 84 Since private plaintiffs use the 
same precedents, this warning is useful. 8S 
82 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 
(1984); and Continental T.v., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977). 
83 Compare, e.g., the cases cited by the NAAG and those cited by 
the Department. Baldwin, supra note 81, compares and evaluates the 
precedents urged in each set of guidelines. 
84 With the assistance of Susan Beth Farmer, Assistant Attorney 
General, State of New York, we have located three cases that state attor-
neys general have already filed or argued under the NAAG Guidelines: 
Virginia v. Winslow, Chancery No. 20942 (Va. Cir. Ct., Prince William 
Cty., Feb. 20, 1987),52 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 437 (Mar. 
5, 1987); In re Thomas Bislow's, Inc., No. 481,875 (Ramsey Cty. 
[Minn.] D.C. Jan. 20, 1987) (assurance of discontinuance); and New 
York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Civ. 86-2345 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 1986), 
51 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 108 (July 17, 1986). During the 
process of discovery in Anheuser-Busch, the New York Appellate Court 
held that purely vertical arrangements to allocate exclusive territorial 
distributorships are per se legal under the Donnelly Act. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, Nos. 28375N, 28376N, 28377N, 28378N, 
28379N, 28380N (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep't, Mar. 5, 1987), 52 ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 478, 489 (Mar. 12, 1987). We thank 
Phyllis A. Errico, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, for providing information on Winslow, and Sarah G. Mulligan, 
Special Assistant Attorney General, State of Minnesota, for providing 
information on Bislow's. 
85 Many observers consider the DOJ Guidelines essentially a 
general-purpose amicus brief for defendants in vertical restraints cases. 
The NAAG Guidelines serve as a general-purpose amicus brief for pros-
ecutors. 
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The DOJ Guidelines have apparently only minimally affected 
private and state cases. Our computer search found only two 
opinions that cited the guidelines in their first 28 months. 86 This 
number is surprisingly low considering that the Commerce Clear-
ing House (CCH) reported at least 100 vertical restraints deci-
sions during this period.87 In contrast, courts routinely discuss the 
DOJ Guidelines in merger decisions.88 
86 Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of North America, Inc., 
605 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), cited the DOJ Guidelines twice, 
once with apparent approval on a patent issue, and once in passing (not-
ing without comment the guidelines' view that tying arrangements "gen-
erally do not have significant anticompetitive potential"). In Will v. 
Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1985), Judge 
Easterbrook, an advocate for per se legality for all vertical restraints, 
favorably cited the guidelines' view that tying arrangements affecting 
less than 30 percent of a relevant market should be legal. 
However, the reaction of Judge Smith in Virginia v. Winslow, Chan-
cery No. 20942 (Va. Cir. Ct., Prince William Cty., Feb. 20, 1987), 52 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 437 (Mar. 5, 1987), may be com-
mon. In reaction to Winslow's argument that its behavior was legal un-
der the guidelines, Judge Smith wrote: "The guidelines prepared by the 
Department of Justice in January of 1985 are, in my opinion, prepared 
simply as guidelines to assist in the efficient use of the resources of that 
department in prosecuting federal antitrust cases. They in effect advise 
the agents and lawyers in the Department of Justice of the types of cases 
they will prosecute. It is obvious from those guidelines that they do not 
prosecute all cases." Letter from H. Smith to Allen L. Jackson, Conrad 
M. Shumadine, and Richard R. Nageotte (Aug. 6, 1986). 
87 We briefly reviewed the 160 listings in indexes to CCH Trade 
Cases, volumes 1985-1, 1985-2, 1986-1, and 1986-2, under "Exclusive 
Dealing," "Exclusive Rights," "Refusal to Deal," "Resale Price Mainte-
nance," and "Tying" and counted only decisions that discussed issues 
treated in the Vertical Guidelines. We counted 96 decisions that we be-
lieve could have cited the guidelines. In addition, we added Pink Supply 
Corp. v. Hiebert, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), 67,046, at 62,409 (8th Cir. 
1986), which was not listed in any of these categories in the index. This 
case could have cited the guidelines in its discussion of whether the al-
leged behavior constituted RPM. Although it was sometimes a matter of 
judgment whether to count a particular case, we believe that the 97 deci-
sions we counted represent a fair count of the relevant universe. 
(footnote continued) 
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In conclusion, the overall value of the Vertical Restraints 
Guidelines depends on their stated and unstated purposes. The 
guidelines successfully convey the Administration's inclination 
not to challenge vertical restraints in the absence of regulation or 
other governmentally imposed restrictions. The absence of any 
such challenges in the last several years reinforces the message. 
The guidelines also clearly express a respectable point of view and 
provide a general, all-purpose amicus curiae brief to the courts. 
They are least successful in two respects. They provide little 
guidance for the few investigations that reach the wide-ranging 
rule of reason analysis; a more structured 'Step Two approach, 
with clear presumptions of legality and illegality might have 
better limited all three types of error. The guidelines' summary of 
prevailing law also understates a firm's risk of facing a private 
suit or challenge by some state attorney general. The strength of 
the displeasure in Congress and among states' attorneys general 
and the poor reception by the courts suggest that a new Adminis-
tration might revise or rescind the guidelines. Antitrust coun-
selors must therefore advise their clients that they risk litigation if 
they rely on the guidelines as a statement of the law. 
Since the guidelines appeared part way into volume 1985-1, we omit-
ted decisions that appeared to have been written before the guidelines 
appeared. Since our LEXIS search of decisions that cited the guidelines 
included about half a year more than the CCH Trade Cases volumes 
that had been published by the time of our LEXIS search, our count un-
derstates the universe. For that reason, and because the indexes have ap-
parently omitted some decisions that discuss vertical restraints, we feel 
confident that the true universe is at least 100 decisions that could have 
cited the guidelines. 
88 One likely reason for the lack of deference to the guidelines is 
that vertical restraints cases have been almost entirely private in the last 
decade or so. In contrast, private parties other than targets of hostile 
takeover attempts must generally surmount numerous hurdles to obtain 
standing to challenge mergers. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of 
Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986), A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTI-
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 199-202 (2d ed. 1984); Susman, Standing in 
Private Antitrust Cases: Where Is the Supreme Court Going?, 52 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 465 (1983). As a result, the federal government brings a large 
majority of merger cases. The government thus has a larger claim for 
expertise in mergers than in vertical restraints. 
